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Abstract
We use a reform of Sweden’s sickness insurance system as a source
of exogenous variation to analyse the presence of moral hazard. As a
result of the reform, the replacement level was reduced from 90 percent
of forgone earnings to 65 percent for the ﬁrst three days; to 80 percent
between day 4 and 90; and remained at 90 percent after 90 days. We
ﬁnd that the incidence of work absence decreased due to the decrease
in compensation level and that eﬀect on duration is in accordance with
moral hazard in the sickness insurance. We estimate the elasticities of
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“Regarding the high absence rate at the Department: Acquiring minor dis-
eases, such as colds or ﬂu, is an act of choice.”
Ragnar Frisch, Nobel laureate and founder of the Econometric Society,
in an announcement in 1962 on the noticeboard at the Department of Eco-
nomics, University of Oslo, Norway.
The sickness insurance system (SI), which provides compensation for lost
earnings due to work absence on the grounds of temporary illness, is one
of the largest social welfare programs in Sweden. In 2002, the expenditure
amounted to SEK 48.3 billion, or about 2 percent of GDP. Between 1998
and 2002, the work-absence, and hence the costs of the insurance system,
increased by almost 75 percent (see eg The Economist 26 October 2002).
This rapid cost increase and subsequent changes in the labor force have
dominated the welfare state debate in Sweden for some time. Among the
main themes in this debate has been the issue of to what extent insured
workers adapt their work-absence behavior, and their work eﬀort, to the
generosity of the sickness-insurance scheme, ie, the classical welfare state
dilemma of moral hazard.
The requirement for the presence of moral hazard in the sickness in-
surance system is that the insured workers can aﬀect their utilization of
sickness insurance, ie their work absence, and that they moreover act on
the basis of economic incentives - the generosity of the sickness insurance
- in this respect. This requirement is, however, not as strong as the above
quotation by Ragnar Frisch might indicate, ie, that the workers can in fact
aﬀect their health status, or that they are engaged in abuse in the sense that
they use the sickness insurance rather than taking vacation, although this
is suﬃcient. Since eligibility for compensation from the sickness insurance
only requires that the health status of the insured worker is such that it
prohibits the worker from doing his or her regular work, and certiﬁcation
from a physician is not needed until the eight day in a work-absence spell,
the only requirement is that the workers’ perception of their health status
and their ability to do their regular work is aﬀected by economic incentives.
There are two problems in empirically studying moral hazard in sickness
insurance.1 The ﬁrst is unobserved heterogeneity. It is well known that
1For a general overview of methodological problems in empirical studies on behavior
in insurance markets, see Chiappori & Salanié (2000).
IFAU - Moral hazard and sickness insurance 3workers with preferences for not being absent from work, or with good health
and who therefore have no need for frequent absences, tend to be more
productive and earn higher wages. Since the sickness insurance system,
like most income security programs, replaces a fraction of forgone labor
earnings, it is more expensive for high-income workers to be absent from
work. In measuring the relationship between the cost of being absent and
work-absence, unobserved heterogeneity will, therefore, lead to a downward
bias of the estimated eﬀect of the program generosity. Second, adverse
selection may result in workers with preferences favoring absences choosing
more generous insurance programs. This may, on the other hand, lead to
an upward bias of the estimated moral hazard eﬀect.
In this study, we use a reform of Sweden’s sickness insurance system
which came in force 1 March, 1991 as a source of exogenous variation in
the cost of being absent from work. In this reform, the compensation level
was reduced from 90 percent of forgone earnings below the social security
ceiling to 65 percent during the ﬁrst three days in a spell of absence and
to 80 percent between day 4 and day 89. After day 90, in order to avoid
disadvantageous eﬀects of the reform on income distribution, the compens-
ation level remained at 90 percent. We are, thus, able to study how the
insured workers change their behavior when a new, less generous policy is
introduced. In other word, we can study the moral hazard problem directly.
The design of the reform has at least two testable implications with
respect to moral hazard. First, the cost of beginning a work absence period
unambiguously increased for all workers due to the reform. To the extent
that workers change their work absence behavior as a result of the change in
the insurance contract, ie, moral hazard is present, this eﬀect implies that
the incidence of work absence (ie, the frequency of spells) will decrease.
Second, there is an unambiguous increase in the cost of returning to work
after day 90 as a result of the possibility of commencing a new absence
spell with an initially lower compensation level after returning to work. If
moral hazard is present, workers on long work absence spells will prolong
the duration of these spells. Thus, the two testable implications work in
diﬀerent directions with respect to the overall prevalence of work absence.
Our data is based on a random sample of 1,396 blue-collar workers ob-
tained from the Swedish Level of Living Survey (SLLS), matched with in-
formation on work absence for each of the 730 days in the years 1990 and
1991. The data on work absence was obtained from registers compiled by
the National Social Insurance Board. Since most work-absence periods con-
sist of only a few days, the data set contains rich information on repeated
IFAU - Moral hazard and sickness insurance 4absence spells for most workers in the sample.
The main empirical analysis is based on non-parametric hazard estim-
ates and discrete-time Cox proportional hazard regression models. The data
allows us to study incidence and duration separately, which is an essential
requirement for analysis of all aspects of the reform mentioned above. Since
we compare the behavior of the same individuals before and after the reform,
we are able to control for unobserved heterogeneity. An additional advant-
age is that we do not need to consider potential compositional eﬀects, for
example due to the increase in the unemployment rate. Finally, the fact
that all workers are covered by the same compulsory insurance programme
means that we are able to isolate the eﬀect of moral hazard from adverse
selection.
The results are robust with respect to the diﬀerent empirical methods
used and show a remarkable resemblance between what might be expected
from the cost changes implied by the reform and actual behavioral change.
Firstly, the incidence of work absence declined signiﬁcantly after the reform.
In other words, economic incentives aﬀect work-absence behavior. Secondly,
the impact of the reform decreased signiﬁcantly after seven days in a spell
when a certiﬁcate from a physician was required for receipt of compensation.
This result can be interpreted as evidence for that control is also eﬀective
in dealing with moral hazard in the sickness insurance system. Thirdly,
the hazard rate from longer then 90 days durations in absence decreased
signiﬁcantly after the reform. Again, this suggests that changes in costs
aﬀect work-absence behavior. The point estimates of the elasticities for the
incidence of work absence with respect to the compensation level in the
sickness insurance system are -1 for males and -0.7 for females.
Previous empirical studies of absenteeism in economics have primarily
been oriented towards the conventional labor supply models, considering the
labor supply decision conditional on the contracted number of hours of work
(see eg Allen, 1981 or Johansson & Palme, 1996 and 2002). Alternatively,
previous studies have been oriented towards empirical personnel economics,
that studies the eﬀect of diﬀerent incentive contracts between the employer
and the employee (see eg Barmby, Orme & Treble, 1991 and 1995). In
this study, however, we explicitly analyze absenteeism as a moral hazard
problem in the sickness insurance system. Henreksson & Persson (2003)
have a similar focus, but there are several diﬀerences between their study
and the present one. First, Henreksson & Persson’s study uses aggregate
data and studies several reforms of the sickness insurance over a long time
period. We use individual data and study individual behavior under two
IFAU - Moral hazard and sickness insurance 5diﬀerent policy regimes. This enables us to isolate the behavioral eﬀect
from the composition of the labor force. Secondly, since we have longitudinal
data covering individuals, we are able to distinguish between the eﬀect of
the reform on the incidence of work absence from the duration of the spells
of absence. This distinction proves to be useful for evaluation of the reform.
Finally, we are able to quantify the behavioral response in elasticities with
respect to the compensation level - an important policy parameter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief
description of Sweden’s sickness insurance and income tax systems. Section
3 describes the data. Section 4 speciﬁes the testable implications on moral
hazard and sickness insurance as a result of the reform and the empirical
model. Section 5 presents the results of the estimations. It also contains a
sensitivity analysis. First, we analyze the overall change in the prevalence
of work absence as a result of the reform. To distinguish the eﬀect of the
reform from any trend, or seasonal variation in the work absence rate, we
use a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimator. We compare the change between
January/February and March/April 1991 with the corresponding change in
1990. The second diﬀerence removes the eﬀect of any seasonal pattern, while
the ﬁrst diﬀerence removes any pre-existing trend in work absence, but not
the eﬀect of the reform. We also discuss two diﬀerent sources of change in
composition of the sample after the reform. These sources may, in turn,
cause bias as a result of unobserved heterogeneity. We use two diﬀerent
stratiﬁed estimators to check for these biases, and ﬁnd that the previous
estimates, based on the Cox regressions, are robust. Section 6 provides a
discussion of the results and conclusions.
2 Sickness insurance in Sweden
Sweden has a compulsory national sickness insurance. It is ﬁnanced by a
proportional payroll tax and replaces earnings forgone due to temporary
health problems that prevent the insured worker from doing his regular job.
Sickness insurance is administered by local insurance oﬃces. Since it is very
hard to judge whether or not a worker is able to perform his or her regular
job, monitoring abuse is very light during the ﬁrst seven days of a sickness
period. However, a certiﬁcate from a physician is required for entitlement
to sickness insurance payments as from the eigths day in a sickness period.
The compensation level - the proportion of earnings paid to the worker
by the insurance system - has been modiﬁed on several occasions in recent
years. In the major reform covered by our longitudinal data - which was
IFAU - Moral hazard and sickness insurance 6implemented on 1 March 1991 - the compensation level was reduced from
90 percent of labor earnings below the social security ceiling2 from the ﬁrst
day in a sickness spell, to 65 percent in the ﬁrst three days in a spell and to
80 percent from day four to day 90.
The 1991 reform of the sickness insurance system was the most important
of several budget cuts proposed in the early spring of 1991. The reason
for these cuts was an increasing budget deﬁcit, excess aggregate demand
and a political ambition to defend the ﬁxed exchange rate for the Swedish
currency (SEK). The increase in the unemployment rates and the general
downturn in the Swedish economy commenced several months later, in the
autumn after the 1991 parliamentary elections. The background to the new
compensation rates was that, in the 1988 parliamentary election campaign,
the Social Democratic government party had guaranteed not to introduce a
“waiting day”3 in the sickness insurance system.
In addition to the compulsory national sickness insurance, most Swedish
workers are covered by negotiated sickness insurance programs regulated in
agreements between the labor unions and the employers confederations. In
general, these insurances replaced about 10 percent of forgone earnings. We
have, however, chosen to not consider these programs in our analysis. The
reason for excluding them is that they diﬀer somewhat between diﬀerent
groups of workers and it is complicated to assign the right insurance to each
worker in the sample. In addition, our policy variable is the compensation
level in the national sickness insurance and since the negotiated insurances
were not aﬀected by the reform excluding them should not aﬀect our results.
3 Testable implications and empirical modelling
As noted in the introduction, the design of the reform of the sickness in-
surance implies that the change in the cost of absence from work depends
on the state of the insured worker, ie, whether he is absent or not and, if
absent, for how long the work absence period has lasted. We deﬁne the
direct cost of being absent from work (ie entering into absence or remaining
in absence) as the percentage share of earnings not replaced by the sickness
insurance. This direct cost changed from 10 to 35 percent during the ﬁrst
2In 1995, about 6.7 percent of all insured workers had labor earning above the social
security ceiling. For a description of the construction and indexation of the social insurance
ceiling see e.g. Palme & Svensson (1999).
3The ﬁrst day in each sickness spell without any compensation from sickness insurance.
IFAU - Moral hazard and sickness insurance 7three days in a spell, but remained at 10 percent from day 91 in a absence
spell.
We deﬁne the cost of returning to work as the diﬀerence in the percentage
share of earnings not replaced by the sickness insurance between remaining
in an ongoing absence period and the corresponding share in a new absence
spell after returning to work. Since the replacement level is 90 percent
irrespective of spell length before the reform this cost is zero in all states.
After the reform it is zero only if the duration of the absence spell is less than
3 days; if the duration is between 3 days and 90 days the cost of returning
is 15 percent; and in spells longer than 90 days it is 25 percent.
A for practical purposes attractive feature of the reform is that these cost
changes are independent of the income tax rate. This means that the costs
deﬁned above are not aﬀected by the 1991 income tax reform. The reform
has the following implications for the direct cost and cost of returning to
work:
i. There is an unambiguous direct cost increase in beginning a work
absence period due to the reduction in the compensation level for the
ﬁrst 90 days of the period.4
ii. For work absence spells of less than 91 days, there is an ambiguous ef-
fect of the reform. First, there is the increased direct cost of continuing
a spell. Second, there is an increased cost of returning to work.
iii. For absence periods longer than 90 days, there is no change in the
direct cost of absence. There is, however, a 25 percent point increase
in the cost of returning to work. The reform, thus, implied an unam-
biguous decrease in the relative cost to remain absent in such spells.
Since the unambiguous implications (i) and (iii) work in opposite direc-
tions the a priori eﬀect of the reform on the prevalence of work absence is
ambiguous.
We use diﬀerent strategies for testing the behavioral response to these
implications empirically. The ﬁrst strategy is based on non-parametric es-
timates of hazard rates and the survival functions (see eg Kaplan & Meier,
1958). Although these estimates have the advantage of not imposing any
functional-form assumptions, the technique has a disadvantage when there
is a need to control for “confounders” (for example, it does not allow us
4One can note that the reform, not only gave an unambiguous relative cost increase,
but also gave an unambiguous cost increase absolutely.
IFAU - Moral hazard and sickness insurance 8to control for the increase in the unemployment rate which occurred in the
autumn of 1991 or controlling for unobserved heterogeneity). In order to do
this, we will use (discrete time) Cox regression models.
For the incidence we use the following speciﬁcation:
λ1(t)=λ0(t)eδIR
, (1)
where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard (ie the hazard before the reform) and IR
is a step function, taking the value 1 after the reform and 0 before.
For the duration (ie absence spells) we use the following speciﬁcation:
λ1(t)=λ0(t)eIR(1−3)β1+IR(4−7)β2+IR(8−90)β3+IR(91−)β4, (2)
where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard, IR(j−k) are impulse functions, such that
IR(j − k)=IRI(j ≤ t ≤ k) where I(.) takes the value one if the argument
within the parenthesis is true, and IR(91−)=IRI(91 ≤ t) is a step function.
We also include I(1 − 3), I(4 − 7) and I(8 − 90) in the speciﬁcation. The
interpretation of β1, β2, β3 and β4 is thus the change in hazard rate caused
by the reform. If moral hazard is present then these coeﬃcients can be
expected to diﬀer from zero. Because of the control of absence from work
we expect that β3 <β 2, even though the cost change due to the reform is
the same. Also, β4 is expected to be less than zero.
As described in the previous section, the unemployment rate increased
substantially in the autumn of 1991. Figure 1 shows the weighted average
of the county-level unemployment rate, together with the aggregate work-
absence rate in the sample. There is a literature in the ﬁeld which suggests
a correlation between general conditions in the labor market and absence
rate as a result of the disciplining eﬀect of high unemployment (see eg Arai
& Skogman Thoursie, 2001, Henreksson & Persson, 2003, Lantto, 1991).
To control for this potential eﬀect we use monthly data on unemployment
levels for each of Sweden’s 24 counties (local labor markets) matched with
the data.
Figure 1 also reveals a seasonal pattern in work absence and the imme-
diate drop in the prevalence just after the reform. Since the 1991 reform of
the sickness insurance system did not occur until March 1, this is a poten-
tial problem. To balance the pre-reform and post-reform samples, we in the
estimations exclude spells beginning in January or February in both 1990
and 1991.5
5The literature on the labor supply eﬀects of income tax reform contains some discus-













































Figure 1: Prevalence of work absence in the sample and the monthly average
unemployment rate in 1990 and 1991.
IFAU - Moral hazard and sickness insurance 10In the empirical analysis, we use an exact maximum likelihood estimator
in discrete time (see Kalbﬂeich & Prentice, 1980, Chapter 4). In addition,
to control for individual heterogeneity we use a stratiﬁed partial maximum
likelihood estimator (see eg Lancaster, 1990, Chapter 9 or van den Berg
2000, Section 6).6
For the exact maximum likelihood estimator in discrete time, the baseline
hazard for the incidence is speciﬁed using a dummy variable for each day
in a work spell. In the case of the duration in work absence, the baseline
hazard is piecewise constant.7
4D a t a
We use the 1991 Swedish Level of Living Survey (SLLS). The SLLS is a mi-
cro data set that contains information compiled from interviews and oﬃcial
public registers for a random sample of about 6,000 individuals. This survey
is described in detail in Fritzell & Lundberg (1994). Data on the dependent
variable - absence from work compensated by the sickness insurance - was
obtained from the National Social Insurance Board by matching with the
SLLS sample. As the data was collected from registers for actual transac-
tions to insured individuals, there are likely to be much fewer measurement
errors as compared with self-assessed data.
We restricted the sample to blue-collar workers aged between 20 and 64
who were employed during 1990 and 1991. The ﬁnal sample consisted of
1,396 individuals (738 males and 658 females).
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the incidence and duration
of work absence, subdivided into the pre-reform and post-reform period,
sion of potential “dynamic eﬀects” in the sense that households may indulge in “intertem-
poral substitution” and adjust their labor supply behavior to the most favorable income
tax regime (see e.g. Hausman & Poterba, 1987). One might conceive a similar behavioral
response to the reform studied in this paper, since the compensation level did not change
for spells initiated before March 1 and the reform was announced about two weeks before
it was implemented. This could imply that some of the behavioral changes recorded in
the data would not be permanent but rather short-term eﬀects of anticipated changes in
compensation levels. However, the prevalence of absence from work shown in Figure 1
does not reveal any increased absence in February 1991 in addition to seasonal pattern.
As a result, we will not consider this potential eﬀect in the empirical analysis.
6Note that we do not have the common problem of using the partial maximum like-
lihood estimator with tied duration here, since no individuals have the same duration
before and after the reform.
7The following speciﬁcation is used: a dummy variable for each day for days 1 to 3
and dummy variables for days 4 -7, 8-14, 14-21, 22-28, 29-42, 43-56, 57-70 and 71-84.
IFAU - Moral hazard and sickness insurance 11Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Before and after the reform of sickness
insurance. Male and female workers separately.
Males Females
Before After Before After
Reform Reform Reform Reform
Average spell length:
Work 93 114 87 108
Work Absence 8.8 11 9.7 12
Number of work spells 2,227 1,812 2,069 1,666
Number of absence spells 1,605 1,182 1,550 1,160
Proportion 1-3 days absence 0.48 0.48 0.54 0.57
Proportion 4-6 days absence 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.16
Proportion 7-89 days absence 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.23
Proportion 90- days absence 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04
respectively. It is apparent from the table that the mean work spells of
females are shorter than the mean work spells of the males. The opposite is
true for the work absence spells. We can also see that both means are higher
after the reform, hence there is a reduction in incidence and a countervailing
eﬀect on prevalence, due to an increased duration of absence from work.
When it comes to the distribution of the days of absence, we can see that the
female workers seem to change their work absence behavior more than the
males and that the longer spells (ie, more than 90 days) are more prevalent
for both men and women after the reform.
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Incidence
Let us begin by analyzing the ﬁrst implication of the reform - the increased
cost of leaving a work spell. Figure 2 shows Kaplan-Meier estimates of the
survival functions in the work spells before and after the reform respectively.
These estimates show that there is a distinct impact of the reform on de-
creasing survival rate for both males and females. The change is highlighted
in Figure 3, which shows the diﬀerence between the post-reform and pre-
reform survival functions along with a 95 percent conﬁdence interval. This
ﬁgure shows that there is a statistically signiﬁcant reduction (ie an increase
IFAU - Moral hazard and sickness insurance 12Table 2: Discrete-time Cox proportional hazard model estimates (Est.)a n d
standard errors (se)o ft h ee ﬀect of the sickness insurance reform on incid-
ence of work absence.
Males Females
Est. se Est. se Est. se Est. se
I
R -0.316 0.005 -0.310 0.007 -0.211 0.005 -0.240 0.007
Unemployment - -0.114 0.010 - -0.077 0.003
Unemployment
2 - 0.022 0.002 - 0.018 0.001
County factor No Yes No Yes
Log likelihood -9668.6 -9646.6 -9929.2 -9892.9
χ
2(25); p − value 44.0; 0.01 72.6; <0.001
Note: χ
2 statistics and p − value for likelihood ratio test of joint signiﬁcance
of local labor market unemployment rate and county factors.
in the incidence) in the survival rate for both males and females.
A further non-parametric analysis is presented in Figure 4, where the
log diﬀerence of the pre-reform and post-reform hazards are plotted for
diﬀerent work durations, along with predictions from a linear regression.
The intercepts from these regressions are -0.36 for male and -0.34 for female
workers respectively, ie, a 36 and 34 percent increase in average incidence
(i.e and increase in the for males and females, respectively).8
Table 2 shows the results from the estimates of the Cox regressions. We
use two diﬀerent speciﬁcations - one which only includes indicators related
to the reform and one which also includes a quadratic speciﬁcation for the
unemployment rate in the county (local labor market), as well as indicators
for each county (ie a county factor).9 The χ2 statistics and the p-value
provided in the table show that local labor market unemployment rate to-
gether with the county factors are jointly signiﬁcant. The moral hazard
eﬀect estimates are statistically signiﬁcant and the estimates are -0.310 and
-0.240 for the males and females, respectively.
These estimates conﬁrm the results of the non-parametric analysis: There
is a signiﬁcant moral hazard eﬀect on incidence. This eﬀect is robust,
although the magnitude changes somewhat when we include controls for
counties and the unemployment rate in the local labor market. Males react
signiﬁcantly more strongly to the reform than females.10
8The intercepts (se) are −0.36 (0.08) for males and −0.34 (0.10) for females. The
corresponding slopes (se) are 0.001 (0.001) and 0.000 (0.001), respectively.
9Sweden is administratively divided into 24 counties.
10A 95 percent conﬁdence interval for the diﬀerence is [0.05,0.09].












Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier survival function estimates of incidence of work
absence before and after the sickness insurance reform.














Figure 3: Before and after the reform diﬀerences of survival functions es-
timates. Incidence of work absence























Figure 4: Scatter plots of the diﬀerences between the log incidence of work
absence before and after the reform and also prediction of these diﬀerences
based on a linear regression model.












Figure 5: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of the duration of work absence
spells before and after the sickness insurance reform.
5.2 Duration
Turning to the duration in work absence, we expect a more complex be-
havioral response to the reform. Firstly, there is an ambiguous eﬀect for
short durtions. This is a result of the increased cost of remaining absent
from work versus a possibly decreased income for returning to work due
to the possibility of beginning a new spell, during the entire initial 90 day
period. Secondly, whatever the net eﬀect during the ﬁrst 7 days, we expect
ad e c r e a s e de ﬀect after day 7 due to the requirement of a certiﬁcate from
a physician. Finally, we expect a decreased hazard for long durations due
to the unambiguous decrease in expected income of returning to work after














Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the diﬀerence between the duration of
the work absence spells before and after the reform.
day 90.
The estimated survival functions for the ﬁr s t4 0d a y si nas p e l lo fa b s e n c e
are displayed in Figure 5 and the pre-reform and post-reform diﬀerence
(including a 95 percent conﬁdence interval) is shown in Figure 6. As is
apparent in Figure 6, there is no signiﬁcant change in the duration of the
absence spell for either males or females.11 In the case of females, however,
there is a marked decrease the survival function up to day 6 in a spell.
The results of the Cox regressions are shown in Table 3. Again, we use
11T h e r ei sn os i g n i ﬁcant impact of the reform on survival functions after 40 either, when
males and females are considered separately. However, when the samples are pooled, there
is a signiﬁcant increase in the duration of the spells 150 days after the reform.
IFAU - Moral hazard and sickness insurance 18Table 3: Discrete-time Cox proportional hazard regression estimates (Est.)
and standard errors (se)o ft h ee ﬀect of the reform on the duration in work
hazard (hazard of ending a work absence spell).
Males Females
Est. se Est. se Est. se Est. se
I
R(1 − 3) 0.062 0.029 0.099 0.033 0.068 0.028 0.077 0.032
I
R(4 − 7) 0.015 0.300 0.040 0.045 0.050 0.031 0.074 0.046
I
R(8 − 90) -0.022 0.021 0.006 0.029 -0.101 0.020 -0.095 0.027
I
R(91−) -0.127 0.030 -0.100 0.036 -0.639 0.027 -0.591 0.035
Unemployment 0.150 0.028 -0.013 0.027
Unemployment
2 -0.032 0.004 0.017 0.042
County factor No Yes No Yes
Log likelihood −4362.5 −4350.8 −4256.7 −4241.9
χ
2(25); p − value 23.32; 0.57 29.6 ;0.27
Note: The baseline hazard is specied as picewise constant. Indicators for
1-3, 4-7 and 8-90 in a spell are also included in the speciﬁcation. χ
2
statistics and p − value for likelihood ratio test for joint signiﬁcance of
local labor market unemployment rate and county factors.
two diﬀerent speciﬁcations - with and without controls for the county and
county level unemployment rate. However, unlike the model for incidence
of work absence, the χ2 statistics and the p-values show that we cannot
reject exclusion of the unemployment rate and county eﬀects from the spe-
ciﬁcation. The results conﬁrm that the hazard from short absence spells
(shorter than 8 days) increased after the reform. This means, following the
anticipated behavioral eﬀects outlined in Section 3, that the eﬀect of the
increased cost dominates the eﬀect of decreased expected incomes of going
back to work and being exposed to the risk of embarking on a new spell of
absence. This result applies to both gender groups and is robust to altern-
ative speciﬁcations. The eﬀect is, however not statistically signiﬁcant for
the 4-7 days for the males.
For spells of between 8 and 90 days we ﬁnd (as expected) reduced eﬀects
of the reform on the hazard from work absence. In the female sample, this
eﬀe t si ss i g n i ﬁcantly negative. Finally, Table 3 shows that the reform had a
signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the hazard on spells of more than 90 days -
this applies to both gender groups and is robust in the alternative speciﬁc-
ations. This result gives support to the hypothesis that the decrease in the
expected income of returning to work has an impact on worker behavior.
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5.3.1 The eﬀect of the reform on the prevalence of work absence
To be able to distinguish the eﬀect of the reform from any trend in the
w o r ka b s e n c er a t ew ee x p l o i tt h ed i s c o n t i n u o u sn a t u r eo ft h er e f o r m .T h e
idea behind this strategy is that behavioral changes that can be referred to
trends, or gradual changes in the society, cannot be recorded as “jumps”
or discontinuous changes in the data,12 as opposed to the eﬀect of policy
interventions that are implemented at a particular date in time. To measure
this eﬀect it would be possible to take the diﬀerence between the prevalence
immediately before and after the reform, eg during January and February
1991 and March and April the same year. However, since there is an appar-
ent seasonal pattern in the work absence rate (see Figure 1) such estimate
would be distorted. To deal with this problem, we use a diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences estimator, where the diﬀerence between January/February and









ma are the mean prevalence in March and April 1991 and
1990, respectively and m91
jf and m90
jf are the mean prevalence in January
and February 1991 and 1990, respectively.
Figure 7 shows the samples day-by-day work absence rate for the period
January to May 1990 (left panel) and the corresponding period in 1991
(right panel) including the date of the reform in March 1. It is apparent
that there is a discontinuous shift in the work absence rate around the date
of the reform, which did not take place around that date the previous year.
The overall level of work absence is, however, somewhat higher in 1991.
Table 4 shows the estimated components and the overall result from
the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimator speciﬁed in equation (3) both for
the males and females and separately for the genders. The results show a
signiﬁcant decrease in the work absence rate in the sample as a result of the
reform. The eﬀect is much stronger for the males than for the females.
12Angrist & Krueger (1999) uses the famous quote “Natura non facit saltum” or “Nature
does not make jumps” from Marshall’s Principles of Economics,a sam o t i v a t i o nf o rt h i s
observation.








































January - May 1990 January - May 1991
March 1991 March 1990
Figure 7: Daily work absence rate January 1 to April 30, 1990 and January
1 to April 30, 1991. Reform date in March 1, 1991 is marked. Males and
Females.
Table 4: Estimated means and standard errors (se) for prevalence of work
absence for diﬀerent sub-periods.
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As discussed in the introduction, work absence is likely to be heterogenous
in any group of workers. It is also likely that individual incidence of work
absence and the duration in absence are correlated. This means that people
with high incidence of work absence also may have long work absence dur-
ations. If this is the case and if moral hazard exists the composition of the
work and work-absence samples may be diﬀerent between the two periods
even though our sample of individuals is the same in the two periods.
If moral hazard exists then would the decreased cost of terminating a
work-absence spell imply, due to heterogeneity, that low-incidence workers
will be overrepresented in the post-reform sample of work spells, compared
to the pre-reform situation, and also that low-hazard workers will be overrep-
resented in the sample of work-absence spells. These compositional eﬀects
w o u l dw e a k e nt h em o r a lh a z a r de ﬀect for the incidence and would lead to
an exaggeration of the moral hazard eﬀect for the duration in work absence.
Since we have data on repeated spells for individuals, we are able to evaluate
whether this neglected heterogeneity is a serious problem.
Adding ﬁxed eﬀe c t st ot h ea b o v em o d e l sw o u l dr e s u l t si nb i a s e de s t i m -
ates (see eg Topel & Ward, 1992). To avoid obtaining biased estimates, we
use the stratiﬁed partial maximum likelihood estimator. This type of estim-
ator has been used in several previous empirical studies (see eg Lindeboom
& Kerkhofs, 2000, or Ridder & Tunelı, 1999), but here we use the indi-
vidual as a stratiﬁcation unit rather than group assignment, which is the
stratiﬁcation unit used in the previous empirical studies mentioned above.13
The results of this analysis, both for the incidence and the duration, are
shown in Table 5. The estimates of the reform eﬀect on the incidence of
work absence are very similar to those obtained in the Cox regression models,
although the precision is, as expected, somewhat inferior. For the duration,
the pattern is similar to the one found in the Cox regression analysis. The
precision of the estimates is very low, however, and the estimates from
the two estimators are never statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
We conclude that the estimates from the discrete-time Cox regressions are
robust with respect to this source of compositional change.
13The stratiﬁed approach needs at least one spell before the reform and one spell after
the reform. If this selected sample reacts diﬀerent to the change in cost than the original
sample of blue collar workers also this estimator would yield biased estimates of the moral
hazard eﬀect for the blue collar workers.
IFAU - Moral hazard and sickness insurance 22Table 5: Estimates (Est.) and standard errors (se) for the stratiﬁed propor-
tional hazard analysis of the eﬀect of the reform on incidence and duration
using the individual as stratiﬁcation unit.
Males Females
Est. se Est. se
Incidence
IR −0.342 0.059 −0.258 0.060
χ2(1); p − value 34.3; < 0.00 18.8; < 0.00
Duration
IR(1 − 3) 0.057 0.074 0.060 0.075
IR(4 − 7) 0.066 0.117 −0.046 0.115
IR(8 − 90) −0.115 0.198 −0.392 0.235
IR(91−) −0.115 30.667 0.747 28.036
χ2(7); p − value 2470; < 0.00 2364; < 0.00
Note: Factors for spells of 1-3, 4-7 and 8-90 days are included
in the speciﬁcation. χ2 statistics and p-value for likelihood ratio
test for joint signiﬁcance of all variables included.
5.3.3 Eﬀects of time-varying heterogeneity
The bias discussed above relates to unobserved and heterogenous propensity
to be absent that is persistent over the time period under study (eg, perman-
ent diﬀerences in health status). However, time-varying heterogeneity may
also aﬀect our estimates. This second form of compositional eﬀect concerns
unobserved and time-varying health eﬀects. Work absence may be seen as
a form of “investment” in one’s health.14 The decreased incidence after the
reform may, following this logic, have a detrimental eﬀect on the general
health status and result in longer work-absence spells. This argument has
been used extensively in the Swedish public policy debate on the sickness
insurance system.
Since we have information on in which month each of the work-absence
spell in our data begun we have the possibility of evaluating this last concern
regarding biased inference. The logic is as follows: if there is a detrimental
eﬀect on health status due to the reform, it should become apparent at
some time after the reform. We should not expect a detrimental eﬀects
14See Paringer (1983) for a discussion on work absence as an investment in individual
health.
IFAU - Moral hazard and sickness insurance 23Table 6: Estimates (Est.) and standard errors (se) from discrete time Cox
proportional hazard model of the eﬀect of the reform on the duration in
work absence using work absence spells that starts in March and April in
either 1990 and 1991.
I
R(.)1 − 34 − 78 − 90 91−
Est. se Est. s.e Est. s.e Est. se
Males
March (n =2 5 5 ) 0.223 0.105 0.058 0.124 0.132 0.070 −0.372 0.073
April (n =2 4 8 ) 0.154 0.102 −0.041 0.142 −0.267 0.059 −0.032 0.093
Females
March (n =2 6 7 ) 0.072 0.106 0.004 0.128 −0.406 0.053 −0.363 0.079
April (n =2 4 6 ) 0.121 0.107 −0.005 0.118 −0.502 0.063 −0.019 0.096
Note: Factors for spells 1-3, 4-7 and 8-90 days included in the speciﬁcation.
ni st h es a m p l es i z e .
immediately after the reform. Hence reform-eﬀect estimates based on work-
absence entrants in March and April in either year should not be aﬀected
by detrimental eﬀects.
To test for this second source of compositional change, we now use the
month of entry into a work-absence spell as a stratiﬁcation unit, and separ-
ately for the ﬁrst two month immediately after the reform-estimate discrete-
time Cox proportional hazard models.
The results are shown in Table 6. Again, it is apparent that the results
are very similar to the original ones although the precision is inferior. This
test, thus, shows that the eﬀect of the reform on the duration is most likely
to be due to moral hazard rather than detrimental eﬀects on the health of
the insured workers.
5.4 Cost elasticities
In the previous analysis, both in the Kaplan-Meier and the Cox regression,
we were able to make inferences regarding the direction of the behavioral
response to diﬀerent cost changes implied by the reform. We could not,
however, say much about the magnitude of these eﬀects. To obtain a sum-
mary measure of these magnitudes of the behavioral response, we use the
estimates presented in the previous sub-section to obtain elasticity estimates
with respect to the compensation level in the sickness insurance system. We
obtain separate measures for the incidence and duration of work absence.
The income of being absent is aﬀected by three components: the wage
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ginal income tax rate. However, the most relevant cost is the cost of forgone
income if absent. Income from the sickness insurance is taxable and for this
sample of blue collar workers, with income below the social security ceiling,
the wage rate and marginal income tax rate do not matter for this relative
cost. Thus, pre the reform the foregone earnings is 90 percent of the income
if working and post the reform the foregone earnings is 65 percent of the
income if working the ﬁrst three days in a spell. This implies a 28 percent
decrease in the foregone earnings from 1990 to 1991.
To measure the changes in the incidence of work absence, we use both
the non-parametric estimates of the hazards and the diﬀerences obtained
from the Cox regression models. The ﬁrst measure is thus calculated as
b ε =
Ã




where b λ(pre) and b λ(post) is estimated under the assumption of constant
hazard for incidence and ∆ is the relative decrese in forgone earnings due
to the reform. The second elasticity measure, which is based on the Cox
proportional hazard regersssion, is simply b ε =( 1− exp(b δ))/∆. Standard
errors (se) are calculated using Gauss approximations.
It is somewhat more complicated to calculate the elasticities for the dur-
ation. This is because the cost changes and the estimates of the behavioral
change both depend on the length of the spell. Under the assumption of
piecewise constant hazards we calculate three sets of elasticities for the ab-
sence spells: for the ﬁrst three days in a spell, for spell lengths of between 4
and 7 days and between 8 and 90 days. These elasticities are, for the second
elasticities, calculated as b εj =( 1− exp(b βj))/∆,j=1 ,2 and 3. For spell
lengths shorter than 4 days the change in forgone earnings is the same as
for the work state (28 percent). However, for spells longer than 4 days and
shorter than 90 days forgone earnings decrease by 11 percent.
Table 7 shows the elasticity estimates. These estimates indicate that the
incidence elasticities obtained from the Cox regression models are somewhat
smaller than those obtained from the non-parametric analysis. As was also
apparent in the results presented in Section 5.1, the behavioral response to
the reform is somewhat larger among male workers. Comparing the precision
in the estimates of the elasticities for incidence with those for the duration,
it can be seen that the precision is superior for incidence elasticities.
One limitation on this manner of calculating elasticities for the incidence
IFAU - Moral hazard and sickness insurance 25Table 7: Estimates of elasticity with respect to the cost of being absent
on the incidence and hazard of work absence. Estimates from the non-
parametric (Nonpar) analysis and the Cox regressions, respectively. Stand-
ard errors (se) are calcuated by using the delta method.
Males Females
Nonpar Cox Nonpar Cox
b εs eb εs eb εs eb εs e
Incidence -1.05 0.02 -0.93 0.02 -0.70 0.02 -0.72 0.03
Duration, 1-3 day spells 0.04 0.17 0.23 0.11 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.11
Duration, 4-7 day spells 0.02 0.54 0.14 2.77 0.39 0.52 0.47 0.30
Duration, 8-90 day spells 0.19 0.39 -0.20 0.19 0.17 0.38 -0.87 0.16
is that changes in the expected income of remaining absent in the post-
reform regime are not considered.
6 Discussion and conclusions
An unambiguous conclusion to be drawn from this study is that there is
moral hazard in Sweden’s sickness insurance system. This is seen primarily
in the reduction in the incidence of work absence after the reform, but also
in the decline in the hazard rate from the durations longer than 90 days.
The result indicating that the eﬀect of the reform diminished in spells of
more than seven days, which required a certiﬁcate from a physician, may be
interpreted as supporting the notion that control counteracts moral hazard,
which, indirectly, shows that moral hazard is present. This result may,
however, also be due to the increasing importance, in these longer spells, of
the higher cost of going back to work after the reform.
The presence of moral hazard shows that there is a policy trade-oﬀ
between the advantageous income-distribution properties of generous com-
pensation levels in the sickness insurance system and disadvantageous be-
havioral responses to such a policy. This is particularly true of the policy
reform studied in this paper. The reason for not changing the compensa-
tion level in spells of more than 90 days was to avoid negative eﬀects on
a disadvantaged group. However, our results indicate that the reform had
disincentive eﬀects on this group of workers deﬁned by long durations only.
The estimates of the elasticities for the incidence of the work absence
with respect to the compensation level in the sickness insurance system
(between -1.05 and -0.93 for males and -0.70 for females) are somewhat
IFAU - Moral hazard and sickness insurance 26higher, particularly for males, than elasticities estimated in traditional labor
supply studies of the eﬀect of marginal tax rates. These elasticities are typic-
ally around 0.1 for male and 0.2 for females in Swedish data, see eg Aronsson
& Walker, 1997, for an overview). The estimates imply that if compensa-
tion levels are increased by 10 percent, the incidence of work absence will
increase by 9 to 10 percent for males and by 7 percent for females. The pat-
tern of higher labor supply elasticities for income security programmes than
income taxes did also emerged in a recent overview by Krueger & Meyer
(2002).
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